Suchergebnisse

"Maintenance of order and curbing violence--the core constituents of internal security-are fundamental responsibilities of any government. developing countries find this task especially challenging since they face a multitude of internal security threats, either caused by misgovernance, internal political turmoil, or provoked from outside. Since independence, the Indian state has grappled with a variety of internal security challenges including insurgencies, terrorist attacks, caste and communal violence, riots, and electoral violence. Their toll has claimed more lives than all of India's five external wars put together. However, after a sharp upswing in the 1980s and 1990s, a number of violence-related indicators have declined over the past two decades. This drop in violence, its causes and implications, have largely gone unnoticed. Three broad questions animate the discussions in "Internal Security in India". What has been the record of the Indian State in controlling violence and preserving order? How have the approaches and capacity of the State evolved to attain these twin objectives? And what have been the implications of the State's approach towards internal security for civil liberties and the quality of democracy?"--

Mobilizing the marginalized -- Historical Dalit social mobilization -- The effects of historical Dalit social mobilization -- Dalit party performance and bloc voting -- Dalit social mobilization and bloc voting -- How mobilization type shapes Dalit welfare -- The identity trap -- Conclusion : whither Dalit politics?

Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India's Election Commission (EC) has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. We use a process‐tracing approach to explain the EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state‐based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers. Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to the EC's broader role. The EC's experience suggests that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under federalism, state‐based electoral forces can produce strong national institutions.